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I.

Introduction

A.

Project Overview

This Article empirically evaluates whether the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)1 is effective in reducing
environmental impacts for oil and natural gas development
projects. “Effectiveness” is defined here as a significant reduction in impacts anticipated between the initial proposal and
the project as approved following completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental statement for “major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”2 NEPA’s
procedural mandate does not require federal agencies to
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1.
2.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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select the least environmentally damaging alternative, but,
rather, to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts
of alternative courses of action before making a decision.3
Indeed, “[i]f the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the
agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other
values outweigh the environmental costs.”4
Because NEPA is a procedural law, scholars have focused
primarily on assessing procedural efficiencies in the decision-making process.5 Accordingly, as the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently noted, “[i]nformation on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely
qualitative.”6 Moreover, as the GAO explained, “agency
activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other environmental review tasks under federal laws, such as the Clean
Water Act7 and the Endangered Species Act;8 executive
orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws.”9
While there is little scholarship testing NEPA’s substantive effectiveness, there is a growing body of research conducted on NEPA analogs in other countries.10 More than
100 countries have emulated NEPA and require some sort
of environmental assessment process for certain projects.11
Consequently, a number of studies have evaluated the sub3.
4.
5.
6.

Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 11:1 (2d ed. 2014).
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-370, National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information Exists on NEPA Analyses 11
(2014); see also Mandelker, supra note 5.
7. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)).
9. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6 (internal citations added).
10. Mathew Cashmore et al., The Interminable Issue of Effectiveness: Substantive
Purposes, Outcomes and Research Challenges in the Advancement of Environmental Impact Assessment Theory, 22 Envtl. Assessment & Project Appraisal
295, 299–301 (2004).
11. Mathew Cashmore et al., The Role and Functioning of Environment Assessment:
Theoretical Reflections Upon an Empirical Investigation of Causation, 88 J. Envtl. Mgmt. 1233, 1233 (2008).
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stantive effectiveness of these other environmental assessment
processes.12 Cashmore et al. (2004), in summarizing these
studies, found that it was difficult to generalize regarding the
substantive effect of environmental assessments because of
“differences in research methodologies, varying interpretations of [substantive effectiveness], and . . . restricted geographical spread . . . .”13 However, the studies reviewed in
Cashmore et al. (2004) indicated that environmental assessments did result in moderate project modifications, usually
accomplished through “fine tuning” of project proposals to
mitigate for or avoid environmental impacts.14 We suspect
that EISs provide similar benefits by “fine tuning” major federal actions.
This Article advances the debate over NEPA’s benefits
and what, if any, NEPA reforms would be most valuable.
This research is timely because multiple pending bills before
Congress propose to “streamline” NEPA by limiting public
comment opportunities, limiting the scope of alternatives
analyzed, limiting the depth of review, accelerating the timeline for NEPA analysis, or limiting administrative or judicial
review.15 Understanding whether NEPA leads to less impactful decisions or fewer constrains on economic activity are
important factors in weighing the merits of these proposals.

B.

NEPA Overview

NEPA is described as the Magna Carta of environmental
laws16 and has inspired numerous countries to adopt their
own NEPA analogues.17 NEPA declares that it is a national
policy to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and]
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation. . . .”18 NEPA’s
lofty policy goals are met through a procedural requirement
that federal agencies identify and analyze impacts on the
environment prior to taking, authorizing, or funding major
federal actions.19 Careful consideration, it is believed, will
lead to better environmental outcomes.
Under NEPA, “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” must undergo an
environmental review prior to federal authorization or fund12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Cashmore et al., supra note 10, at 300–01.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 299, 302.
See, e.g., H.R. 2647, 114th Cong. (2015) (expediting NEPA for forest and
timber management activities); S. 468, 114th Cong. (2015) (categorically excluding certain vegetation treatments from NEPA analysis); H.R. 348, 113th
Cong. (2015) (establishing procedures to streamline the regulatory review, environmental decisionmaking, and permitting process for construction activities undertaken, reviewed, or funded by federal agencies); H.R. 1616, 114th
Cong. (2015) (creating categorical exclusions for certain natural gas development related activities); H.R. 1792, 114th Cong. (2015) (delegating to the
states NEPA compliance responsibilities for livestock grazing authorizations).
Mandelker, supra note 5, § 1:1.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 905
(2002).
43 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
Id. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).

Vol. 7 No. 1

ing.20 When a major federal project’s impacts are known to
be significant, compliance requires completion of an EIS.21
Completion of an EIS can take several years and cost millions of dollars.22 While EISs are required for less than 1%
of projects evaluated under NEPA,23 EISs receive more attention than less extensive compliance documents because they
involve “high-profile, complex, and expensive” projects.24
EISs are prepared in stages. At the outset of the NEPA
process, the lead agency publishes a Notice of Intent to
Prepare an EIS (“NOI”) in the Federal Register.25 The NOI
describes the action contemplated and invites public comment. After receiving and considering public comment, the
lead agency prepares a draft EIS analyzing the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed action, along
with alternative means of achieving the purpose and need
for the proposed action.26 The public is invited to review the
draft EIS and provide comments, which the agency reviews
and considers, responding as appropriate and revising the
NEPA document as needed before issuing the final EIS.27
If significant deficiencies are identified, the lead agency
may prepare and release a revised draft EIS or a supplemental EIS.28 The NEPA process concludes with publication of a
Record of Decision (“ROD”) documenting the agency’s final
decision.29 The public is then provided an opportunity to
review the ROD and pursue either an administrative appeal
or litigation.30
Because environmental impacts are normally quantified
at each phase of the NEPA process, evaluation of iterative
changes between each phase may provide an indicator of the
benefits obtained from NEPA review. Significant environmental impact reductions would indicate NEPA efficacy, and
whether impacts that are subject to regulation independent
of NEPA are reduced more rapidly than those that are not
regulated independently, may provide insight into the underlying cause of impact reductions.

II.

Methods

In designing this project, we sought to answer several questions: (1) Are final NEPA decisions likely to have lower environmental impacts than the initial proposal? (2) What are
the economic implications of impact reductions? (3) If iterative changes occurring through the NEPA process lead to a
less impactful project, at what stage in the process do most
20. Id.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2014).
22. U.S Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 13–15; Piet deWitt &
Carole A. deWitt, Preparation Times for Final Environmental Impact Statements
Made Available From 2007 Through 2010, 10 Envtl. Prac. 123, 125 (2013)
[hereinafter deWitt & deWitt, Preparation Time]; Piet deWitt & Carole A.
deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement?,
10 Envtl. Prac. 164, 168 (2008) [hereinafter deWitt & deWitt, How Long
Does It Take?].
23. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 8.
24. Id.
25. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.22 (2014).
26. Id. §§ 1502.14–1502.16 (2014).
27. Id. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4 (2014).
28. Id. § 1502.9(a), (c) (2014).
29. Id. § 1505.2 (2014).
30. Id. § 1505.1 (2014).
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reductions occur? (4) Is that reduction attributable to NEPA,
intervening factors, or a combination of both? (5) Is there a
relationship between the number of alternatives considered
in an EIS and the amount of environmental impact reduction that occurred through the NEPA process?
Answering these questions is complicated by the tremendous variability in NEPA content, making comparison across
projects difficult. This difficulty is a reflection of the breadth
of projects subject to NEPA. NEPA’s implementing regulations also, necessarily, avoid one-size-fits-all disclosures in
favor of an analysis that is meaningful in the context of each
proposed action. NEPA regulations, therefore, direct agencies to “identify significant environmental issues deserving
of study . . . [and] deemphasize insignificant issues, narrowing the scope of the environmental impact statement process accordingly.”31 Because the NEPA process is intended
to be flexible enough to address diverse local conditions and
issues, NEPA documents may also measure or model similar
impacts in different ways. One NEPA document may, for
example, disclose direct employment impacts by year, while
another may combine direct and indirect employment into a
single value disclosed for the life of the project.32 While both
approaches are consistent with NEPA’s objectives, this lack of
uniformity can complicate efforts to compare projects.
In testing the efficacy of NEPA, the conducted research
focused on EISs because of their iterative approach, the extensive analysis and documentation they contain, the importance of the decisions they consider, the time and expense
involved in EIS preparation, and the controversy often surrounding the projects that require the submission of an EIS.
To maximize consistency of impact measures, we focused
our analysis on EISs for oil, natural gas, or coalbed methane
(collectively “O&G”) development authorized by the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and occurring in
Colorado, Montana, Utah, or Wyoming (n=13). Including
draft, final, and supplemental EISs, these projects produced a
total of forty records. This Article focused on O&G projects
because they involve discrete and easily quantifiable impacts,
such as the acres of surface disturbance, the miles of road and
pipeline constructed, and the number of wells drilled. These
four states were chosen because the large amount of federally
managed public lands in this area results in a higher number
of recently completed EISs for O&G projects than was found
in other regions.
EISs satisfying the selection criteria were identified by
using the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s EIS Database.33 Database coverage begins in January 2004, which
provides the starting point for our analysis. We considered
all NEPA projects completed (projects which resulted in the
publication of a ROD) through October 2014. Even with this
narrow scope, there was a great deal of variability between
EISs, apparently driven by local conditions and concerns, as
well as by differences, in field office procedure.

We obtained and reviewed every NOI, draft EIS, final EIS,
supplemental EIS (if any), and ROD for each project meeting our selection requirements. Impact metrics associated
with the proposed action in the draft EIS, preferred alternatives in the final EIS, and agency decisions contained in
the ROD were recorded. Consistent with deWitt and deWitt
(2008), we also recorded document release dates,34 as well as
the number of alternatives considered in each document. A
complete set of the impact metrics that were identified and
recorded is listed in Table 1. Metrics shown in italics failed to
meet minimum sample size requirements and were not carried forward for statistical analysis. We initially speculated
that NOIs might contain key indicators, such as the number
of wells proposed, hence providing an additional data point,
but there was insufficient information available to make most
NOIs a meaningful indicator of anticipated project impact
or benefit.
Statistical analysis was limited to variables that were
reported in at least eight of the thirteen EISs. Where necessary to facilitate comparison and meet minimum sample
size requirements, agency-provided data was converted into a
consistent metric. As an example, some EISs calculated water
use per year and others calculated water use for the life of the
project. To create a common metric, we converted water use
per year to water use for the life of the project by multiplying
yearly water use by the agency’s estimated project life.
Economic measures (hydrocarbon production, jobs created, and tax revenue generated) were reported with less consistency than environmental measures, creating a challenge
to capturing NEPA’s economic consequences. Hydrocarbon
production, for example, represents an obvious indicator of
commodity production. However, only three EISs estimated
natural gas extraction, only four EISs estimated both gas
and oil extraction, and five EISs did not estimate oil or gas
extraction at all. We attempted to overcome this problem
by converting volumetric O&G extraction data into British
thermal units. However, even with this conversion, we failed
to satisfy our minimum sample size requirements, preventing us from effectively analyzing resource production. We
instead focused on state and local tax revenues (n=9) and
oil and gas related jobs (n=13) as common measures of economic impact.
This design allows comparison of the environmental and
economic impact indicators for a project at three stages. To
determine whether and when NEPA influences these indicators, we compared the draft EIS proposed action, the final
EIS agency preferred action, and the ROD selected action.
We used single-tailed paired t-tests to determine whether
impacts changed significantly throughout the process.35 The
paired t-test is appropriate because we are comparing data
from the same EISs but at different stages of the process—
the draft EIS, final EIS, and ROD.36 Pairing helped reduce
the variance in the results caused by different initial project

31. Id. § 1500.4(g) (2014).
32. Id. § 1508.25(c) (2014).
33. Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/eisdata.html (last visited Aug.
3, 2015).

34. deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 165.
35. The single-tail reflects our initial hypothesis that NEPA would reduce environmental impacts and economic benefits. See generally Dawn Hawkins, Biomeasurement: A Student’s Guide to Biostatistics 80 (3d ed. 2014).
36. See id. at 143.
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size. The single-tail reflects our initial hypothesis that NEPA
would reduce environmental impacts and economic benefits.
To better describe when project changes occur in the process, we calculated the percentage of the total reduction that
occurred for each impact at the final EIS and ROD stage.
We also sought to determine how the number of alternatives affected environmental impact reduction. First, we
conducted a regression analysis to determine whether any of
the initially proposed impact factors predicted the number of
alternatives considered by the agency. Second, we conducted
a regression analysis to determine whether the number of
alternatives considered predicted impact reductions.
To determine whether EISs with more alternatives resulted
in significantly higher impact reduction than EISs with less
alternatives, O&G EISs were separated into two groups—the
More Alternatives Group and the Fewer Alternatives Group.
First, we determined the average number of alternatives considered in the thirteen final EISs. Next, we created one group
for EISs that considered the average number of alternatives or
more and a second group that considered less than the average. We then determined the total reduction for each impact,
as measured by the difference in an impact between the draft
EIS and the ROD, for each of the two groups. Lastly, we
tested whether the More Alternatives Group resulted in a
statistically significant difference in impact reduction using
single-tailed t-tests.37 We also calculated impact reduction
as a percentage of the initial draft EIS impact measure. We
include percentage information because of the potential relationship between the size of initial draft EIS impacts and the
number of alternatives considered.38
We selected our impact metrics based on four factors; we
looked for indicators that: (1) addressed a range of impact
areas (air, water, land, and economic); (2) were quantified
using common units of measure or units that could be converted into a common measure; (3) were utilized in all or
almost all of the EISs; and (4) provided a balance between
37. The single-tailed t-tests reflect our initial hypothesis that more alternatives will
result in greater impact reductions.
38. If the number of alternatives considered is positively related to the initial impacts in the draft EIS, then we would expect agencies to consider fewer alternatives for projects with smaller impacts and more alternatives for projects with
larger impacts. In this case, any impact reduction difference between our two
groups might have been caused by differences in initial impacts. For example,
the More Alternatives Group may have greater gross impact reduction relative
to the Fewer Alternatives Group simply because there were more initial impacts. We use percentage reduction purely as a descriptive statistic, as percentage reduction partially controls for the confounding variable of initial impact
size by showing impact reduction as a proportion of the initial impact. We did
not test for statistical significance using our percent change values because of
problems inherent to statistical analysis of percentages. See Andrew J. Vickers,
The Use of Percentage Change From Baseline as an Outcome in a Controlled Trial
Is Statistically Inefficient: A Simulation Study, 1 BMC Med. Res. Methodology 1, 5 (2001) (suggesting the use of an Analysis of Covariance model and
cautioning that “[p]ercentage change from baseline should therefore not be
used in statistical analysis”). Because of our low sample size and unequal samples between groups (one group had a sample size of four and the other group
nine), an Analysis of Covariance was inappropriate for our data. See generally
Robert J. Grissom & Jon J. Kim, Effect Sizes for Research: Univariate
and Multivariate Analysis 352 (2d ed. 2012) (stating Analysis of Covariance is generally inappropriate for unequal sample sizes); Marjorie A. Pett,
Nonparamtetric Statistics for Health Care Research: Statistics for
Small Sample Sizes and Unusual Distributions 56 (1997) (stating that
unequal and small sample sizes render some statistical analysis impossible).
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Table 1
Impact Metrics
Number of wells and well pads
Amount of surface disturbance:
s temporary,
s permanent, and
s wetlands
Air emissions:
s PM10,
s PM2.5,
s NOX,
s SO2, and
s CO
Miles of road and pipeline constructed
Volume of water used
Volume of oil and natural gas produced*
Amount of tax revenue generated by state and local governments
Number of jobs created
Project cost*
* Metrics that were not analyzed statistically because of sample size
constraints

indicators that are subject to independent statutory or regulatory mandates to minimize impacts and indicators that are
not independently regulated. The fourth criteria is important
in determining whether impacts between these two groups
were reduced at similar rates. This, in turn, provides insight
into the driving factors behind impact reduction.
The amount of water utilized and surface disturbance are
used as broad indicators of environmental impact. Water use,
however, may understate efforts to reduce water consumption, as efficiency improvements may be offset by water used
for directional drilling and improved hydraulic fracturing
which, as explained below, may lead to large reductions in
surface disturbance. Such tradeoffs are inherent in the NEPA
decision-making process, where reducing impacts to sensitive
resources may necessitate an increase in impacts elsewhere.
We distinguish between temporary and permanent impacts
to maintain consistency with EIS disclosures. We track wetland disturbance because of its universality in EIS disclosures, and because the Clean Water Act requires the Army
Corps of Engineers, which permits wetland disturbance, to
approve the least damaging practicable alternative.39 Comparing changes to surface disturbance against changes in
wetland disturbance may therefore provide some insight into
the comparative effect of NEPA and section 404 of the Clean
Water Act.
We track job creation and tax revenue generation in order
to assess the relationship between reductions in environmental impact and changes in economic benefits. We assume that
wells will produce similar volumes of hydrocarbons, and that
the number of wells can therefore also be used as an indicator of potential economic benefits. We track the number of
well pads, miles of road, and miles of pipeline as indicators
of surface impact because the maturation of directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies may allow multiple
39. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2014).
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wells to be drilled from a single pad. This, in turn, could
drive a reduction in surface disturbance. Comparing changes
in the number of wells and well pads may provide some
insight into whether impact reduction is driven by NEPA or
other factors.
Air emissions were disclosed in almost all EISs, providing a suite of common impact reduction indicators. Some
criteria pollutants, however, have a higher importance in the
O&G context. Based on modeling for the Greater Natural
Buttes EIS, for example, emissions of particulate matter less
than 10 µm in diameter (“PM10”) would increase by 171% to
449% depending on the amount of development approved.40
Emission of nitrogen oxides (“NOx”), by comparison, would
increase by just 21% to 46%.41 While the change in PM10
dramatically outpaces changes in NOx emissions, NOx
emissions are generally a higher concern for regulators. The
Intermountain West has traditionally had very good air quality, and particulate levels are generally well below National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”). Mountain valleys experiencing O&G development, however, are frequently
struggling with ozone (“O3”) readings exceeding NAAQS.42
Minimizing tropospheric O3 formation necessitates reducing
emissions of the chemicals that react with sunlight to form
O3. NOx is an important O3 precursor and, therefore, represents the more important indicator, at least with respect
to Clean Air Act43 compliance.44 Emission controls used to
address NOx emissions may provide a secondary benefit by
reducing emissions of other criteria pollutants.

III. Theory
Our first hypothesis, based on informal review of numerous NEPA documents, is that the proposed action is likely
to undergo modification throughout the NEPA process, and
that final approvals are likely to authorize a level of impact
that is lower than initially proposed. We test this hypothesis by comparing predictions of quantifiable environmental
indicators at multiple points during the NEPA process and
quantifying how these indicators change over time.
Our second hypothesis, in light of criticisms of NEPA
compliance’s negative impact on project cost and feasibility, is that reductions in environmental impact will come at
a heavy economic cost, as measured in changes to capital
cost, employment, and tax revenue generation. We test this
hypothesis by tracking changes to quantifiable economic
indicators throughout the NEPA process and comparing
those changes to changes in environmental impacts.
40. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Greater Natural
Buttes Final Environmental Impact Statement, App. G at ES-3 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Peter M. Edwards et al., High Winter Ozone Pollution From Carbonyl Photosynthesis in an Oil and Gas Basin, 514 Nature 351, 351–54 (2014); Marco Rodriguez et al., Regional Impacts of Oil and Gas Development on Ozone Formation
in the Western United States, 59 J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass’n 1111, 1111–18
(2009).
43. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
44. Volatile organic compounds combine with NOx to form O3, but were not addressed because of inconsistent disclosure across O&G projects.
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Our third hypothesis is that impact reductions will predominantly occur between the draft and final EIS. We test
this hypothesis by comparing changes in environmental
impact between draft and final EISs and the ROD.
Our fourth hypothesis, in light of NEPA’s procedural
mandate, is that other laws will drive the majority of impact
reductions. We test this hypothesis by comparing environmental impact reductions for indicators that are subject to
independent statutory or regulatory mandates to reduce
emissions or impact to indicators that are subject to no such
independent mandate.
Our fifth hypothesis is that EISs that consider more alternatives will result in greater environmental impact reduction.
This hypothesis recognizes that alternatives are considered
the “heart of the environmental impact statement”45 and
Congress intended “that consideration of alternatives, combined with mandatory findings regarding the environmental
cost of each, would motivate agencies to take greater interest
in less-harmful options.”46 We test this hypothesis by dividing EISs into two groups, based on the number of alternatives
considered, and comparing the amount of impact reduction
that occurred for each group.

IV.

Results

A.

EIS Preparation Time

Between 1998 and 2007, deWitt and deWitt (2008) reported
that federal agencies took, on average, 1227 days to proceed
from NOI to final EIS.47 While deWitt and deWitt (2008)
did not provide completion time for BLM EISs, they did
note that the U.S. Forest Service proceeded faster than its
sister agencies, averaging 990 days from NOI to final EIS.48
Both figures include the time to complete a supplemental EIS
where supplementation was required. As deWitt and deWitt
(2013) reported subsequently, EIS preparation time increased
by a rate of 19.9 days annually from 2007 through 2010,
and BLM’s “non-planning” EISs required an average of 1421
days to proceed from NOI to final EIS, though this does not
appear to reflect time required to complete required supplemental EISs, if any.49
We found that preparation of O&G EISs can take longer
than other EISs. The time taken to complete an O&G EIS,
as measured from the NOI to final EIS, averages 1553.1 days
(range = 980 to 2313 days), or 1617.9 days (range = 1057 to
2556 days) when measured from NOI to the ROD. We also
found that it takes longer to prepare a draft EIS (an average
of 990.5 days, measured as the time between NOI and draft
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2014).
46. James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion of Remote and
Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. Land Res. & Envtl. L. 287, 292 (2005) (citing
115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Senator Jackson accompanying
NEPA’s conference committee report)).
47. deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 168.
48. Id.
49. deWitt & deWitt, Preparation Times, supra note 22, at 128. deWitt & deWitt
describe “non-planning” EISs as those completed for purposes other than general resource management plans or national and regional planning. See id.
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Table 2
Change During the EIS Process
Impact
(Sample Size)

Initial Value,
Final Value
(% Reduction of Initial Value)

Change Draft to Final
EIS
(% of Total Change)

Change Final EIS to
ROD
(% of Total Change)

Total
Change

Permanent Surface Disturbance
(acres)
(n=13)

6,137.7
5,348.8
(13%)

- 696.7**
(88%)

-92.3
(12%)

-788.9**

Temporary Surface Disturbance
(acres)
(n=13)

10,846.5
9,784.2
(10%)

-912.9**
(86%)

-149.4
(14%)

-1,062.3**

139.8
98.8
(30%)

-41.0
(100%)

0
(0%)

-41.0

3,221.5
2,967.1
(8%)

-219*
(86%)

-35.5
(14%)

-254.5**

3,652.4
3,618.8
(<1%)

-22.4
(67%)

-11.2
(33%)

-33.5*

845.6
811.7
(4%)

-24.4*
(72%)

-9.5
(28%)

-33.9**

2,150.4
2,102.1
(2%)

-33.6
(70%)

-14.7
(30%)

-48.3*

15,182.8
14,353.8
(5%)

-471.3
(57%)

-357.6
(43%)

-826.9

2,487.5
1,890.2
(24%)

-505.5*
(85%)

-91.8
(15%)

-597.3**

53.1
50.3
(5%)

-1.9
(68%)

-0.9
(32%)

-2.8

1,714.7
1,623.7
(5%)

-33.0
(36%)

-58.0
(64%)

-91.0

344.0
260.6
(24%)

-79.1
(95%)

-4.3
(5%)

-83.4*

1,795.8
1,380.9
(23%)

-399.6*
(96%)

-15.3
(4%)

-414.9*

11,703,556
11,039,111
(6%)

-622,220
(94%)

-42,222
(6%)

-664,440

667.8
648.8
(3%)

-17.8
(93%)

-1.3
(7%)

-19.1*

Wetland Disturbance (acres)
(n=8)
Well Pads
(n=13)
Wells
(n=13)
Roads (miles)
(n=13)
Pipelines (miles)
(n=12)
Water Use (acre-feet)
(n=12)
NOX (tons per year)
(n=13)
SO2 (tons per year)
(n=12)
CO (tons per year)
(n=10)
PM2.5 (tons per year)
(n=11)
PM10 (tons per year)
(n=12)
State and Local Tax (dollars per
year)
(n=9)
Jobs
(n=12)
* p < .10, one-tailed.
** p < .05, one-tailed.
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EIS), than to go from a draft EIS to the ROD (627.4 days
on average).

B.

NEPA Process and Impact Reduction

Consistent reductions in environmental and economic measures occur as projects progress from the draft EIS to the
final EIS and then to the ROD. The majority of reductions
occurred between the draft EIS and the final EIS, with relatively minor reductions occurring between the final EIS and
ROD. A summary of results is shown in Table 2.

C.

Alternatives Considered

The number of alternatives considered during the draft
EIS and final EIS ranged from two to ten and two to eight
respectively. The mean number of alternatives considered
during the draft EIS was 4.6 and the final EIS was 4.3. The
difference in means between draft EISs and final EISs can be
attributed to one project. The draft EIS for the Jonah Infill
Project considered ten alternatives, but five of these alternatives were not carried forward into the final EIS because the
BLM concluded that they were duplicative of the remaining
alternatives.50

D.

Relationship Between Alternatives Considered and
Proposed Project Impacts

Of the impact factors, acres of proposed temporary surface
disturbance was the best predictor of the number of alternatives considered (r(12)=0.51, p=0.0058). This factor was
followed by the proposed number of wells (r(12)=0.49,
p=0.0073), proposed acres of permanent surface disturbance
(r(12)=0.48, p=0.0082), and proposed number of well pads
(r(12)=0.47, p=0.0098). In contrast, the number of alternatives was not a statistically significant predictor of the amount
of reduction for any of the impact measures.

E.

Alternatives and Impact Reduction

To better assess the relationship between the number of alternatives and impact reduction, we separated the EISs into two
groups based on the number of alternatives considered in the
final EIS51: (1) those that considered four or more alternatives
(“More Alternatives Group”) and (2) those that considered
three or fewer alternatives (“Fewer Alternatives Group”). This
resulted in four EISs in the Fewer Alternatives Group and
nine EISs in the More Alternatives Group.
The More Alternatives Group had greater impact reductions than the Fewer Alternative Group for eleven of the
50. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Jonah Infill Drilling Project Sublette County,
Wyoming 2-7 to 2-8 (2006).
51. We use the number of alternatives considered in the final EIS because the mean
number of alternatives considered decreased from the draft EIS to the final
EIS in our sample. Consequently, the alternatives considered at the final EIS
stage are a better representation of the options available to the agency decisionmaker when making the final agency decision at the ROD stage.
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thirteen environmental impacts. Six of these differences were
statistically significant. The Fewer Alternatives Group had
lower impact reductions for the two economic metrics; however, neither of these differences was statistically significant.
We also calculated the percent reduction for each impact
by group, which was accomplished by dividing the impact
reduction for each value by the initial value of the impact.
We include this value for descriptive purposes, as there is
an apparent relationship between initial impact levels and
the number of alternatives considered. A summary of these
results is shown in Table 3.
EISs that considered fewer alternatives were completed on
average 312.1 days sooner than those that considered more
alternatives. EISs that considered fewer alternatives took a
mean of 1408.5 days to complete. EISs that considered more
alternatives took a mean of 1720.6 days.

V.

Discussion

A.

EIS Preparation Time

Based on our analysis and data from deWitt and deWitt
(2008 & 2013), it appears that O&G EISs take longer to prepare than EISs for other types of projects. While this analysis does not indicate why O&G EISs take longer, we posit
that the size, complexity, and public attention associated
with these projects drives longer completion times. Agency
staffing levels may also play an important role in increasing
preparation time.
In our study, one of thirteen EISs (7.7%) required supplementation between issuance of the draft EIS and the ROD.
This result is consistent with deWitt and deWitt’s (2008)
finding that 6.2% of EISs required pre-ROD supplementation.52 The deWitt and deWitt (2008) report also found that
publication of a supplemental EIS added an average of 835
days to the time required for NEPA compliance.53
With O&G EISs taking an average of over 4.4 years to
proceed from NOI to ROD, frustration at the time and
expense involved in NEPA compliance is not surprising.
While legislative proposals to establish deadlines for EIS
completion appear responsive to these concerns, they
could produce the opposite result. If an accelerated timeline results in NEPA documentation that fails to satisfy
the “hard look” requirement, supplementation will be
required, and the expense and time involved in completing a supplement—almost 2.3 additional years according
to deWitt and deWitt’s (2008) analysis54 —may outweigh
the benefit resulting from expedited NEPA. Increased
emphasis on NEPA’s mandate to “deemphasize insignificant issues”55 may have a more lasting impact, as may collaborative approaches to NEPA that reduce the likelihood
of litigation-driven EIS supplementation.

52.
53.
54.
55.

deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 171.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 169–70.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(f ), (g) (2014).
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Table 3
Impact Reduction and Number of Alternatives
Impacts

Permanent Surface Disturbance
(acres)
Temporary Surface Disturbance
(acres)
Wetland Disturbance (acres)
Well Pads
Wells
Roads (miles)
Pipelines (miles)
Water Use (acre-feet)
NOX (tons per year)
SO2 (tons per year)
CO (tons per year)
PM2.5 (tons per year)
PM10 (tons per year)
State and Local Tax (dollars per
year)
Jobs

Fewer Alternatives Group
Impact Reduction
(% Reduction of Initial Value)
81.4
(3%)
81.4
(2%)
52.5
(57%)
36
(5%)
3.8
(<1%)
2.9
(1%)
13.9
(6%)
2,231
(6%)
184.8
(10%)
1.5
(8%)
38.0
(6%)
0.0
(0%)
10.3
(2%)
193,333
(4%)
6.3
(4%)

More Alternatives Group
Impact Reduction
(% Reduction of Initial Value)
1,103.4
(15%)
1,492.2
(11%)
37.2
(24%)
351.6
(8%)
46.8
(<1%)
47.7
(4%)
59.8
(2%)
129.8
(3%)
780.7
(28%)
3.6
(5%)
126.3
(5%)
114.6
(26%)
617.3
(25%)
900,000
(6%)
25.5
(3%)

Difference in Impact
Reduction Between
Two Groups
1,022.0**
1,416.8**
-15.3
315.6*
43.0
44.8*
45.7
-2,101.1
595.9
2.1
88.3
114.6*
607.0*
706,700
19.2

* p < .10, one-tailed.
** p < .05, one-tailed.

B.

Environmental Impact Reduction

EISs appear to reduce environmental impacts. Impacts to
all measured elements evidenced a reduction in impacts
between draft EIS and ROD. On a percentage basis, reductions were largest for the air quality parameters PM10, PM2.5,
and NOx, which all saw initial impacts reduced by 23% or
more between draft EIS and ROD. Reductions in PM10 are
important because O&G development is anticipated to result
in a major increase in emission of these larger particulates.56
Reductions in NOx are important because NOx are chemical
precursors of O3, and some valleys in Utah and Wyoming
are experiencing very high O3 levels that have been attributed to O&G development.57 Impacts to wetlands were also
reduced by more than 30% between draft EIS and ROD.
Each of these elements is subject to independent action-forcing regulation, perhaps indicating that impact reductions are
56. Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40.
57. Edwards et al., supra note 42; Rodriguez et al., supra note 42.

attributable to compliance with environmental laws other
than NEPA.
Sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and carbon monoxide (“CO”) are
also subject to independent action-forcing regulation, but
both experienced statistically insignificant and comparatively minor impact reductions (initial impacts reduced by
5%). Regulation alone, therefore, does not appear to guarantee significant impact reduction. Lower rates of emission
reduction may indicate that less effort is expended on reducing emission of these pollutants because the project areas
analyzed in these EISs appear to have ambient SO2 and CO
levels that are well below NAAQS.58 Other potential alternate explanations are discussed below.59
A reduction of less than 1% in the number of wells drilled
resulted in 13% reductions in permanent surface disturbance
and 10% reductions in temporary surface disturbance. Both
58. Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40, at 2-3, 2-4, 2-7 (discussing background concentrations air quality standards).
59. See infra Part V.D.
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reductions were statistically significant, indicating meaningful reductions may occur without a hard regulatory mandate
such as the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act. These impact
reductions are consistent with arguments that NEPA is effective in its goal of encouraging agencies to take a hard look at
feasible alternatives to the proposed action and that reductions in impact can be achieved at a comparatively small economic cost.
We anticipated that the concurrent maturation of directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques would
result in a reduction in surface disturbance. In contrast to
vertical wells which tap only the hydrocarbons directly below
the well, directional drilling allows operators to drill non-vertical wells that more efficiently drain hydrocarbons located in
narrow horizontal formations that may be thousands of feet
from the well pad.60 Hydraulic fracturing injects liquids into
hydrocarbon bearing formations in order to increase formation permeability and the rate of hydrocarbon recovery.61
The co-utilization of these technologies would allow developers to locate multiple wells from a single well pad, and in
so doing, reduce the total number of well pads developed.
The reduction in well pads would equate to a reduction in
surface disturbance.62 The number of well pads did decrease
by 8% between draft EIS and ROD, compared to a less than
1% reduction in the number of wells over that same period,
which is consistent with a shift towards development of multiple wells from a single pad. The reduction in number of
well pads also likely contributed to the reduction in road and
pipeline construction and associated disturbance, because
fewer pads necessitate a less extensive inter-pad road and utility network.63

C.

Impacts on Economic Benefits

As hypothesized, environmental impact reduction appears to
come at an economic cost, though that cost is lower than we
anticipated. Both job creation and state and local tax revenue
declined between the draft EIS and ROD; however, declines
in impacts to key environmental indicators occurred at
higher rates than declines in economic indicators. Projected
job growth declined by a statistically significant 3% between
the draft EIS and the ROD. However, declines in job growth
occurred at a lower rate than reductions in eleven of thirteen
environmental impacts, nine of which experienced statistically significant reductions. While reductions in state and
local tax revenue generation declined by 6% between draft
EIS and ROD, a lower rate than seven of thirteen environ60. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Northern San
Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane Final Environmental Impact Statement
2-4 (2006) (discussing alternate drilling technologies); see also Oil Field Glossary, Schlumerger, http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/ (last visited Sept.
28, 2015).
61. Cong. Research Serv., R40894, Unconventional Gas Shales: Development, Technology, and Policy Issues 21–25 (2009); see Oil Field Glossary,
supra note 60.
62. Dan Arthur & David Cornue, Technologies Reduce Pad Size, Waste, Am. Oil
& Gas Rep., Aug. 2010; see Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40 at 2-32
(showing reduced surface disturbance under alternative utilizing directional
drilling and multiple wells from a single well pad).
63. Id.
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mental indicators, declines in tax revenue were not statistically significant.
With four environmental indicators experiencing more
than 20% reductions in impacts and nine environmental
indicators experiencing statistically significant reductions, it
appears that environmental impacts can be reduced through
the NEPA process without driving a commensurate reduction in economic benefits. Furthermore, reductions in pollution emissions may provide an indirect economic benefit
by reducing absenteeism and health care costs.64 Also absent
from our analysis of economic impacts are the potential
benefits to recreational use of public lands that result from
reduced well pad density.

D.

Impact Reduction and Causation

Researchers speculate that the NEPA process itself can drive
impact reduction through several mechanisms. For example,
NEPA forces a scientific analysis of a proposed action, and
this analysis alone could indirectly lead to impact reduction.65 The “internal reform” model suggests that NEPA
forces changes in agency priorities, personnel, and process
that result in more sustainable decision-making.66 In contrast, the “external reform” model contends that the increased
transparency and public involvement associated with NEPA
may result in more sustainable decision-making.67 The internal and external models may work together to provide synergistic benefits.
Our results indicate that a statistically significant reduction in project impacts occurs over the course of the NEPA
process, and the largest reduction—80% of total impact
reduction across all elements—occurs between publication
of the draft EIS and final EIS. The reduction in impacts
could be attributed to NEPA-related mechanisms, intervening variables, or a combination of both. Possible intervening
64. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78
Fed. Reg. 3086, 3089 (proposed Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 50.18) (estimating the economic benefit derived from revised PM2.5 standards at $3.6 to $9.1 million).
65. Cashmore et al., supra note 10, at 304–05.
66. Robert V. Bartlett, The Rationality and Logic of NEPA Revisited, in Environmental Policy and NEPA 55–56 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997).
Prior to NEPA’s enactment, agencies were professionally homogeneous; for
example, the U.S. Forest Service was predominantly staffed by foresters and
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with engineers. This homogeneity resulted
in agencies that were less sensitive to environmental impacts outside of their
realm of expertise. After NEPA was enacted, agencies were forced to “diversify
their staffs so that specialists could take responsibility for preparing EISs. . . .”
Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 Envtl. L. 681, 691 (1990). The most obvious example, described
by Friesema and Culhane, is the U.S. Forest Service using “subtle and not so
subtle techniques” to generate enough public pressure to justify severe restrictions and project modifications during the NEPA process. H. Paul Friesema
& Paul J. Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 Nat. Res. J. 339, 354–55 (1976).
67. Bartlett, supra note 66; see Culhane, supra note 66, at 692 (“[NEPA provided] a
new opportunity for environmental groups, concerned citizens, and individual
scientists to influence agency decisions. Before NEPA, these groups were, at
best, underrepresented in agencies’ constituency networks.”) (concluding that
NEPA encourages an agency to consider ramifications of a decision on “[their]
public reputation and political capital; costly and time-consuming lawsuits;
disciplining congressional responses including budget reductions, legislative
amendments, or oversight hearings; and disciplining personnel, policy, or budget moves by the White House”).
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causes include: (1) impact reduction occurring during earlier
NEPA decisions, (2) gaming of the NEPA process, (3) legal
requirements contained in other environmental laws, and
(4) intervening economic or technological factors. These are
addressed in turn.

insight into the longitudinal relationship between these
tiered NEPA decisions.76

1.

The legal test of a NEPA document is not whether it produces
the least environmentally damaging alternative, but whether
the lead agency took a “hard look” at the impacts of the proposed action and a reasonable range of alternatives to that
action.77 In contrast, laws like the Clean Air Act, Clean Water
Act, and Endangered Species Act require impact avoidance
and minimization as well as mitigation of unavoidable environmental impacts. The Clean Air Act, for example, requires
employment of the “best available control technology” for
new major emitting facilities.78 The Clean Water Act’s section
404(b)(1) guidelines require that “no discharge of dredged or
fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem.”79 Similarly, section 7(a)(2)
of the Endangered Species Act imposes a duty on federal
agencies to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of
listed species and to avoid adverse modification of designated
critical habitat.80 It follows that, while NEPA may require a
public vetting of the environmental consequences of various
courses of action, other laws could drive impact reduction.
If NEPA’s critics are correct, and NEPA does significantly
less to advance environmental protection, we would anticipate that the impact reductions to environmental attributes
that are subject to independent action-forcing regulations,
such as air quality standards, restrictions on dredging or filling wetlands, or endangered species protections, would far
outpace the reductions to environmental attributes that are
uniquely attributable to NEPA. While impact reductions for
some regulated resources did occur at very high rates when
compared to unregulated resources, reductions in temporary and permanent surface disturbance were statistically
significant and cannot be attributed directly to a regulatory
mandate to minimize these impacts.81 These findings may
indicate that NEPA can lead to environmental impact reductions independent of other environmental laws.
Reductions in air quality impacts, however, are an area
where reduction appears to be driven heavily by other environmental laws. Elevated ground-level O3 levels have been
discovered in many rural counties that are experiencing

Impact Reduction During Antecedent NEPA

O&G development occurring on federal land necessitates
a series of federal decisions preceding the O&G EIS, each
of which may trigger NEPA and provide an opportunity for
impact reduction.68 Because this Article addresses only the
final phase of a multi-tiered federal decision-making process,
it may understate total impact reductions.
O&G leasing and development decisions occur against
the backdrop of decisions contained in the BLM’s Resource
Management Plans (“RMPs”).69 RMPs contain broad-scale
decisions, such as which areas will be open or closed to mineral development, and cover a planning area that can be several million acres in size. RMPs are invariably major federal
actions with significant environmental impact and, therefore, require EIS preparation, which subjects them to the
kinds of iterative impact reductions already discussed.70 For
areas that are open to development, RMPs typically indicate
which surface use stipulations will apply.71
The surface use stipulations contained in RMPs fall into
four general categories. Standard lease terms and conditions allow the BLM to require operators to move surface
disturbing activity by up to 200 meters or limit activity by
up to 60 days.72 The BLM can impose longer timing limits
or broader surface use restrictions, under “timing limits” or
“conditional surface use” stipulations, as needed to protect
sensitive resources.73 Where timing limits and conditional
surface use stipulations are insufficient, the BLM can impose
a “no surface use” stipulation, which precludes surface disturbing activities while allowing operators to access hydrocarbons from horizontal wells drilled outside the no surface
occupancy area.74 The BLM can also choose to forego leasing
entirely.75 Surface use stipulations contained in RMPs provide
the BLM with a powerful tool to protect sensitive resources,
and significant environmental impacts may thus be avoided
before the O&G development EIS is even considered.
Our analysis looks only at environmental impact reduction occurring after the BLM determines which lands will be
open to leasing and, for those lands, which surface use stipulations will apply. Accordingly, our analysis almost certainly
under-reports total impact reduction occurring through all
phases of the NEPA process. Research investigating impact
reduction occurring as part of the antecedent NEPA analysis
for RMP decisions is underway and will provide additional
68. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dept. of the Interior, H-1601-1, Land
Use Planning Handbook 11–13 (2005).
69. Land use plans are required under 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
70. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 68, at 17, app. C at 23–24.
71. See id. at 13.
72. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 (2014).
73. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 68, app. C at 23–24.
74. See id.
75. See id.

2.

Reductions Driven by Other Environmental
Laws

76. John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, and Impact Reduction: An
Empirical Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning in the Intermountain West (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Authors).
77. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983);
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012).
79. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2014).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
81. Although not quantified in this study, the Endangered Species Act and consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service appeared to play a relatively
minor role in surface disturbance reduction. We speculate that this minor role
in O&G EISs is, in large part, due to (1) habitat avoidance measures called for
in the RMP, and (2) the avoidance of riparian habitat impacts associated with
Clean Water Act requirements.
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rapid O&G development,82 raising concern that these areas
may be designated as non-attainment areas for O3 under the
Clean Air Act.83 Accordingly, increased emphasis has been
placed on reducing emissions of O3’s chemical precursors,
such as volatile organic compounds84 and NOx.85 Such an
emphasis is consistent with our finding that NOx emission
reductions were greater than reductions in other criteria pollutants assessed in O&G EISs, with the exception of PM2.5.
Accordingly, the Clean Air Act, rather than NEPA, may be
the primary driver in NOx emission reductions. Technologies deployed to reduce NOx and volatile organic compound
emissions may also provide some reduction in particulate
emissions,86 potentially offering partial explanation for
PM10 and PM2.5 emission reductions. As SO2 is not an O3
precursor, and SO2 levels are a less significant concern in
most areas undergoing O&G development,87 the absence
of significant reductions in SO2 emissions is also consistent
with this interpretation. However, even if the Clean Air Act
is the primary driver behind emission reductions, NEPA
may still play an important role in assessing the viability of
specific pollution reduction technologies and thereby facilitate their deployment.
It therefore appears that NEPA can lead to a statistically
significant reduction in some environmental impacts, even
if reductions are not as rapid as those resulting from statutes that include a strong impact avoidance or minimization mandate. We hypothesize that NEPA’s disclosure and
hard look requirements focus agency and public attention
towards impact reduction, even where hard regulatory triggers do not exist.

3.

Gaming NEPA

When negotiating, parties often begin by asking for more
than they expect to obtain in order to create room for concessions.88 Similarly, strategic NEPA proposal enlargement may
occur if permittees believe the NEPA process will inevitably result in a reduction in the extent of authorized impacts
or facilities. Proponents could inflate the initial proposal in
order to obtain their desired outcome, following anticipated
82. Samuel Oltsman et al., Anatomy of Wintertime Ozone Associated With Oil and
Natural Gas Extraction Activity in Wyoming and Utah, 2 Elem. Sci. Anth. 1,
13 (2014).
83. See Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. EPA, No. 12-1309, slip op. at 3, 23
(D.C. Cir. June 2, 2015) (involving numerous consolidated cases challenging
EPA designation of the Uinta Basin as “unclassifiable” for ozone).
84. Volatile organic compound emissions were not reported consistently in the
EISs we reviewed.
85. Ground-Level Ozone: Basic Information, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/ozonepollution/resources.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2015); see also Edwards et al., supra note 42, at 351–55; Rodriguez et
al., supra note 42.
86. See, e.g., Michael J. Kleemana et al., Control Strategies for the Reduction of Airborne Particulate Nitrate in California’s San Joaquin Valley, 39 Atmospheric
Env’t 5325, 5325–41 (2005) (noting that each gram of NOx emitted locally
within the San Joaquine Valley produced 0.23–0.31 grams of particulate ammonium nitrate).
87. See, e.g., Bureau of Land Mgmt, supra note 40, at 2-3, 2-4, 2-7 (showing SO2
levels are well below NAAQS).
88. See Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. Dis. Res.
325, 351, 355 (1996); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles
in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1999).
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reductions. Alternatively, permittees may inflate the initial
proposal so they may later offer to reduce impacts and, by
doing so, curry favor with the lead agency and the public.
While gaming during the NEPA process has been
suggested,89 there is little empirical information to indicate
whether gaming is a common practice. In contrast, gaming by exaggeration or inflation of cost estimates is a documented industry strategy in Clean Water Act and Clean Air
Act regulation.90 The result of gaming in these contexts is
“illusory” impact reductions.91 If gaming of the NEPA process does occur, some amount of the impact reduction we
measured may be illusory.

4.

Intervening Economic or Technological Factors

Technology and associated economic factors may change
over time, making environmentally preferable technologies
easier to deploy commercially. For example, the maturation and convergence of directional drilling and hydraulic
fracturing technologies occurred concurrent with the proposals evaluated in our analysis.92 Dramatic increases in
O&G production are widely attributed to this technological
maturation and convergence.93 Hydraulic fracturing allows
operators to greatly increase production, while improvements
in directional drilling technology allow O&G operators to
reach laterally for much greater distances.94 This technological convergence allows operators to drill multiple wells from
a single well pad, thereby allowing higher levels of O&G
production from fewer well pads.95 Our results indicate that
consolidating wells onto fewer well pads reduced the amount
of surface disturbance associated with well pads and also the
amount of roads and pipelines needed to connect these pads
89. See Robert W. Adler, In Defense of NEPA: The Case of the Legacy Parkway, 26 J.
Land Res. & Envtl. L. 297, 300 (2006).
90. Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There A Place
for Pollutant Trading?, 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 137, 158 (1998) (“[I]t is obvious that some of the disparity between estimates and current costs stems from
inflated estimates used by industry to oppose the program.”); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 231, 259
(1999) (“Pollution trading programs create stronger incentives to manipulate
the numbers and cheat, because credits that are fraudulently created are still
worth money.”); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 159, 180 (1997) (“[I]t is in the strategic interest of regulatory targets to exaggerate prospective costs in an effort
to avoid regulation.”).
91. Drury et al., supra note 90, 263–64 (1999). On the other side, NEPA cynics
claim that agencies have learned to game the NEPA process so that results are
typically decided at the outset, and simply ratified by a well-oiled EIS factory
in which the right issues are addressed, and the right words are magically invoked to survive any judicial review. See Adler, supra note 89.
92. See Cong. Research Serv., supra note 61 at 17–18 (explaining that “[c]ombining hydraulic fracturing with directional drilling has opened up production
of tighter (less permeable) petroleum and natural gas reservoirs, and in particular, unconventional gas shales”).
93. Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (2013).
94. Michael J. Wozniak & Jamie L. Jost, Horizontal Drilling: Why Its Much Better
to “Lay Down” Than to “Stand Up” and What Is an “18º Azimuth” Anyway?, 57
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 6A-1, 6A-11 to 6A-12 (2011).
95. See Robert Keiter & Kristin Lindstrom, Lessons From Nine Mile Canyon:
Achieving Consensus Over Energy Development on the Public Lands, 57 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 3-1, 3-20 (2011) (“Originally, [the operator] had planned
to use traditional extraction techniques of 8 well pads per section, but the new
technology enabled it to drill 16 or more wells from a single pad.”).
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and convey hydrocarbons to market. Reducing roads and
pipelines further minimized ground disturbance.
The statistically significant reduction in surface disturbance associated with O&G development that we observed
may, therefore, have more to do with technology maturation
than NEPA. That said, NEPA undoubtedly creates a forum
for the public to demand consideration of emerging technologies and for agencies to evaluate the viability of impact
reducing technologies. In fact, several EISs included alternatives emphasizing directional drilling and consolidated well
pads that were developed in response to public comments.96
It, therefore, appears that NEPA may provide an environmental benefit by hastening the deployment of environmentally preferable technologies.
It is unclear whether O&G operators would have transitioned to consolidating wells on a single pad as rapidly as
they have absent NEPA.97 Perhaps comparing the rate of
emergent technology adoption for projects subject to NEPA
against the rate of adoption for projects where NEPA does
not apply (such as projects occurring on state or private land)
would provide some insight into this question. However, at a
minimum, we can say that NEPA provided the public with
an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of alternative technology. As such, NEPA represents an important mechanism
for accelerating adoption of emergent technologies that result
in reduced environmental impacts.

E.

Alternatives and Impact Reduction

Given our limited sample size (n=13),98 our results regarding the effect of the number of alternatives considered on
impact reductions should be considered preliminary in
nature. However, our analysis indicates that consideration
of four or more alternatives does result in greater impact
96. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Decision for the Gasco Energy Inc. Uinta Basin Natural Gas Development
Project 11–12 (2012) (“[The Agency Preferred Alternative] was developed
after the public comment period on the Draft EIS . . . . Surface impacts were
reduced by requiring directional drilling . . . . [T]his alternative was developed
as a result of public comment . . . .”); Letter from Bill Barrett Corporation,
to U.S. Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with author)
(explaining that, in part because of “a significant amount of time discussing
the project with other stakeholders and reviewing public comment[,]” the
company decided to reduce the number of wells and well pads in a new alternative); Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Northern
San Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane Project Record of Decision 3 (2007)
(“I am selecting Alternative 7, with the identified modifications and required
mitigation measures, because it most effectively addresses the issues surfaced during the extensive public input process while honoring the lease rights held by the
proponents.”) (emphasis added).
97. Operators would likely prefer to use traditional vertical wells under most circumstances as “[t]here is lower cost and risk by drilling vertically. Reserves
often can be captured adequately with vertical wellbores. When pumping is
required to produce the oil, maintenance costs are lower in vertical wellbores
[as compared to directional].” Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Final San
Juan National Forest and Proposed Tres Rios Field Office Land and
Resource Management Plan 491 (2015) (“Directional drilling techniques
can be particularly helpful in environmentally sensitive or culturally rich areas
. . . [however] these benefits are offset by the incremental increase in both cost
(approximately 20%) and operational risk associated with drilling these more
complex boreholes.”).
98. As mentioned, the More Alternatives Group had nine EISs and the Fewer Alternatives Group had four EISs. Supra Part IV.E.
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reduction than consideration of three or fewer alternatives.
The More Alternatives Group had statistically significant
greater reductions in environmental impact than the Fewer
Alternatives Group for six of the thirteen environmental
indicators. Despite the preliminary nature of this finding,
it appears that evaluating more than three alternatives can
improve impact reduction. Nevertheless, these reduced environmental impacts appear to come at the cost of increased
EIS preparation time, with EISs considering three or fewer
alternatives being completed 312 days sooner than those
that considered four or more alternatives.
These reductions appear to be independent of the relationship we observed between project magnitude and number of
alternatives considered. Our results indicate that the number of alternatives considered by an agency is related to the
magnitude of the proposed project. For example, agencies are
likely to consider more alternatives for projects with a greater
potential for surface impacts. Based on this relationship, one
might conclude that differences in impact reduction are simply the result of different project sizes, meaning the More and
Fewer Alternatives groups are equally effective at reducing
impacts but the overall impact reduction is different because
there are more impacts to be reduced for the More Alternatives Group.
However, if this conflation were true and initial project
size, not the number of alternatives considered, was the true
cause of the difference in impact reduction, then we would
expect the percentage of total impact reduction for the More
and Fewer Alternatives Groups to be roughly equal. However,
impact reductions for the More Alternatives Group greatly
exceeded those of the Fewer Alternatives Group, as measured
by the percentage of the initial proposed impact, for seven of
the thirteen impacts, with one impact being roughly equal.
Thus, initial project size alone does not explain the difference
in impact reduction between the two groups.
Although preliminary, these results are intuitive. Consideration of more alternatives indicates a more thorough review.
When an agency considers three or fewer alternatives, the
agency may have insufficient information regarding available
options and the associated tradeoffs.
One may argue that some EISs involve straightforward
proposals that do not necessitate a significant range of alternatives. However, as discussed,99 since EISs are required for
less than 1% of projects evaluated under NEPA,100 and as
these projects have already been found to have impacts that
are environmentally significant,101 there appears to be little
reason to severely restrict the scope of alternatives in an EIS.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on our review of O&G projects within a four-state
region, NEPA compliance does appear to produce final decisions that are substantially less impactful on the environment
when compared to initially proposed projects. Impact reduc99. Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 11:1 (2d ed. 2014).
100. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 8.
101. See 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2014).
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tions occur primarily between the draft EIS and final EIS
stages of the NEPA process, with minor reductions occurring
between the final EIS and ROD. While reductions may be
partially attributable to legal requirements external to NEPA
(such as Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or Endangered
Species Act requirements or intervening economic and technological factors), external factors alone do not adequately
explain impact reductions.
This Article also found that the number of alternatives
considered within an EIS affects both the magnitude and
proportion of impact reduction. EISs that consider a broader
range of alternatives are more effective at reducing environmental impacts. We, therefore, encourage federal agencies
to include a robust range of alternatives in their EISs and
to use the alternative development and evaluation process to
determine whether emergent technologies can reduce environmental impacts without severely impacting project cost
or viability.
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In light of these findings, we also urge caution when considering proposals to streamline the EIS process, because
streamlining efforts may reduce NEPA’s tangible benefits.
We note that aggressive EIS timelines could, at least in
theory, hinder the impact analysis and, in so doing, make
EISs more susceptible to legal challenge. Court-ordered EIS
supplementation would almost certainly negate any benefits
of expediting proposals.
We hope that this first attempt at quantifying the environmental efficacy of NEPA will engender a productive debate
on the question of NEPA reform. We acknowledge that the
limited scope of our analysis may restrict the applicability of
our results and the generalizations that can be drawn from
them. However, even assuming that intervening considerations are significant contributing causal factors in NEPA
impact reduction, there is little doubt that NEPA leads to
less environmentally harmful decisions and that it does so
without a dramatic reduction in economic benefits.

